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Articles
Norval Morris*

Law Schools and Other
Reformatories'

It is, of course, a great and undeserved honor for me to be offering
this year's Horace E. Read Memorial Lecture. The slightest
acquaintance with Dean Read's career reveals the range and quality
of his contributions to the law, to the institutions of society and to
legal education. It is a great pleasure to be playing a role in these
annual memorial celebrations. His life is a model of service and
scholarship to all who wish to live the life of the law at its higher
levels and refutes those who see our profession as narrow or
intellectually confined. Nevertheless, I am unsure whether I am
glad that the focas of these celebrations is on legal education, and
not on either of the two other areas of Dean Read's particular
professional concerns; the topic interests me deeply but it also raises
my anxiety to a fearsome level. I find that I have been trying to
teach in law schools for thirty years, my first position being as a
temporary acting probationary assistant lecturer at the London
School of Economics in 1949 (a position, you will appreciate, of
awesome power), followed by teaching and sometime deaning in
Melbourne and Adelaide in Australia, and Harvard, Utah, Colorado
and Chicago in the United States of America. And never, never
before have I risked a speech on legal education. I have been
suspicious of the topic and of those who talked about it, regarding
the curriculum committee of the law school as an exercise in
self-aggrandizement, rather than pedagogical analysis and those
who lectured publicly on legal education as likely to be
compensating for their vacuities in the classroom. And now here I
am among their ranks.
But surely there should be something useful for me to dredge out
of this thirty years' experience. I hope so, and I shall try.
It is not quite true to say that I have never before lectured on this
topic. I have, on occasion, spoken at graduation ceremonies in
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prisons, using a title "Prisons, Law Schools and Other Reformatories," from which, with suitable modifications for the more
gentle sensibilities of the Canadian legal culture, I stole the title of
this afternoon's address to you.
Public ceremonies in prisons take place in a rather different
setting from the one in which we now find ourselves - the graceful
academic hall is not part of the prison architect's armamentarium. I
well recall the first time I spoke at a public occasion in a prison; it
was at Stateville Prison, situated at Joliet in Illinois. It was, I
immodestly confess, a huge success, attracting a standing ovation
- seats were lacking and the assembly's gratitude for my ultimate
silence was unbounded. I had intended to speak to them on the text
"the pen is mightier than the sword," but was persuaded by the
warden that this was in exquisitely poor taste.
Instead, I told them of the history of their prison, of its leading
architectural feature of panopticons (if that is the proper plural),
designed, astonishingly enough, by the father of utilitarianism,
Jeremy Bentham, in England in 1794, though never built there, but
reproduced in the (for him) unimaginable territory of southern
Illinois in the 1920s. Each panopticon today holds over 700
prisoners in a circular cellular arrangement from which one guard in
a central tower can observe all 700 - and, to his pervading
discomfort, all 700 can observe him. I told them of their
predecessors' earlier hopeles§ habeas corpus action, during World
War II, in which it was argued on their behalf that the tank-like
appearance of Bentham's panopticons subjected the prisoners to a
disproportionate risk of having their habitat mistaken for oil storage
depots and being bombed from the air.
I told them, too, of my skepticism of the prison as an engine of
rehabilitation - whatever that may mean - and of some of the
political problems of prison reform, a topic from which even their
protracted upright posture did not distract their riveted interest.
The pretentious enormity of it all has but recently struck me,
brought home as I tried to prepare myself for the Horace Read
Memorial Lecture. To be preoccupied, as I am, with two aspects of
changing people - prisoners and law students - as if it were
properly any of my business. And what is astonishing is that my
wife, my children and I have been modestly well-fed, housed and
clothed by this meddlesome preoccupation. There are little enough
hard data, indeed even soft data are lacking, to suggest that this
preoccupation has done any good at all. My colleagues and I in the
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law schools may or may not have helped any student of the law to
more efficient practice of the law, to deeper insights into the law's
labyrinthine mysteries - probably not. My correctional colleagues
and I may or may not have helped any prisoner to a less criminous,
more socially acceptable life - probably not. The former are
probably too good to harm; the latter in too much trouble to assist.
And to be rewarded for these uncertain efforts is no minor
achievement - it is a tribute to human generosity.
But I do comfort myself in these efforts with one important
thought of Aldous Huxley's. He allowed that there were only two
satisfactory professions - medicine and astronomy. The doctor can
without difficulty persuade himself that he is doing some good; the
astronomer can be damned sure that he is doing no harm. The great
Hippocratic precept, primum non nocere, is oddly enough easier to
achieve in prisons and reformatories than in law schools. The
present huge, overcrowded prisons, jails and reformatories of
America (courtesy forbids that I should reflect upon Canadian
correctional institutions, as does my ignorance) certainly do a great
deal of harm to many of their inmates and to the society that
supports them. In this unwitting Gulag Archipelago, we cannot
protect the weak from the strong, the victims from the predators, the
minorities from the majorities, whoever they may be. Most
fortunately, life in the law schools of Canada and the United States
of America is hardly that rigorous.
Apart from these contrasts, there are two other points of
comparison that I wish to make between prisons and law schools as
a foundation for some reformatory suggestions concerning law
schools. Both themes flow from a restructuring of training programs
in prisons and reformatories which seem to me to have some likely
applicability to legal education.
The first hopefully useful comparison is this: the prisoner, and by
this analogy the law student, must by-and-large be allowed to plan
his own training program. Of course, the illiterate prisoner has to be
taught to read and write, and those lacking numeracy be taught to
count if they are to approach any more advanced vocational training
program, in the same way that the basic Common Law subjects
have to be imposed on the law student in his first few quarters or
terms of legal studies; but after that it is very much better to allow
the prisoners and law students to choose for themselves. The
reasons are fairly obvious and require no extensive elaboration.
Central to them is the determinative quality of the level of

216 The Dalhousie Law Journal

motivation, the horse-to-water syndrome.
This theme has been accepted throughout the federal prison
system in the United States and is rapidly gaining acceptance in
other systems. We no longer pretend that we can observe the
prisoner in a classification program, decide what training he needs,
place him in vocational classes and reward him in the coinage of
earlier release for their successful completion. It is not difficult,
rather it verges on the impossible, to predict behavior in the
community from behavior in prison; the pretense that we have this
ability has deepened the pool of hypocrisy in our prisons and has
tended to turn them into great schools of dramatic art. Predictable
release dates, subject to good behavior (and this for purely
administrative reasons), together with an adequacy of training
programs available to the prisoner but not imposed on him, are
taking the place of coerced programs and unpredictable parole
release dates. The reformatory and the prison lower their levels of
pretension to be coercive agents for change; their role is more
realistically assessed as deterrent and punitive but with the possibly
saving grace of a serious purpose to facilitate the inmate's
self-regeneration to a more contributing and socially acceptable life
if he is so inclined - it becomes facilitative of self-development not
pretending to be effectively coercive to that end.
Now, I am not suggesting that law schools are deterrent and
punitive (though occasionally I have my suspicions about this), but I
am suggesting that the point of facilitating self-development rather
than of trying in lock-step to impose personal change is compelling
also in relation to legal education. The heart of the matter is that the
task of legal education is to teach a culture, not a craft, just as the
task of prison training is to teach lawful living, not a trade.
Craftsmanship (like a trade) is important, please do not misunderstand me, but the point is that the craft of the law can be taught
around a wide diversity of legal topics in a way that could not be
taught if, for example, what one was trying to do was to train a
carpenter or a plumber. There is, of course, no more noble vocation
than that of carpenter, but it does not require the inculcation of a
culture; by contrast, taking the intelligent and responsible citizen
and helping him to turn himself into a lawyer is introducing him to
the culture of the law. It is a process of cultural adaptation. He or
she needs to know the history of the law and of the lawyers; the
philosophy of the law, which is jurisprudence; the folkways, values
and language of the law. The student must acquire some knowledge
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of the processes of the law and of the role of law in society. He must
learn how to interview and to advise clients, to negotiate, to litigate,
to advise legislative committees, and to play a role in refashioning
the law. There are many paths to this culture of the law, and it can
be taught as well around the two other areas of Horace Read's
particular concern -

conflict of laws and legislation -

as it can

around torts or conflicts or bills and notes. Of course, criminal law
and the criminal justice system is in my view the superbly
appropriate topic for particular concentration, but I shall not inflict
my idiosyncratic reasons for that view on you this afternoon.
It is not a squalid report on the hardening of my arteries and the
declining flow of blood to my brain to confess that I cannot
remember the details of criminal law cases from one year to the
next. The broad sweep of the case law stays reasonably well with
me, but the precise procedures and exact language that are essential
subjects of a craftsman-like mastery of the topic move fairly swiftly
from my memory and always have done so. Further, I find that
those who cling to the contrary aspiration and report details of
statutes, case law, and procedure with great confidence and
apparent precision usually lapse into repeated error. I have ceased to
mistake their confidence for accuracy; I check on them.
The argument is an old one, but that does not make it wrong.
What it comes to is this: the student must learn a few basic legal
principles, most of which can be encompassed in the first year of
law school with its concentration on the great traditions of the
Common Law. Thereafter the refinement or deepening of these
concepts can be done around a wide choice of subject matters and a
considerable diversity of learning situations, and, if I may now risk
the contentious, can be as well done in whatever mixture of
classroom discussions, seminars and clinical education the student
finds congenial as in any prescribed program. Hence my plea here is
one that has already been largely accepted, and that is for a wide
freedom of choice after the early literacy of the Common Law has
been encompassed. A corollary is that we must most vigorously
resist the sort of pressures that have been exerted recently in the
United States on the law schools from certain groups within the
judiciary and the organized profession for prescribed subjects in law
schools as a condition precedent to admission to the Bar or to
admission to audience before particular courts. I hear similar
pressures are felt and voices singing this same sad practical tune are
also raised in Canada. Such suggestions mistake the culture of the
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law for a craft. The range of details necessary for effective
pursuance of all the crafts of the law cannot and should not be taught
in law schools.
Let me turn to the other, somewhat uncertain, springboard for a
comparison between correctional training and legal education: the
avoidance of doing harm. How this is to be achieved in prisons and
reformatories is a long, long story, which I would greatly enjoy
talking to you about, but this is not the occasion. Well, you say,
what possible harm do we do to the student in the law school? Let
me put the matter curtly, recognizing that thus one courts
overstatement. For most, not all, the harm we do is that we unduly
delay their involvement in the realities of legal practice. The United
States and Canada seem to me to have invented the longest
adolescence that the world has ever seen. One ceases to be an
adolescent when one gainfully supports oneself, not at a summer job
as a counselor at a children's camp, but in the trade or profession
one proposes as one of the two central anodynes of one's life - for
Freud was in my view precisely correct when he suggested that the
two functions that make human life bearable are working and
loving. And those of us whose work is a profession in which we can
take joy are surely blessed. So adulthood for us cannot begin until
we enter on our real work.
Let me set aside those few students who will spend their law
school summers working on the law review and ask what the
optimum summer vacation experience is that we can arrange for the
rest. When I had to face this question for my eldest son and my
second son's wife, both of whom have the good fortune to be
lawyers, I found that there was no doubt in my mind that working in
a fine law firm was the best possible experience for them during
their first and second summer vacations from law school. My
colleagues seem to arrange this same program for those of their
families and friends aspiring to be lawyers, and at the University of
Chicago we certainly do our utmost to provide these opportunities
for as many of our first and second year students as we can - and
we largely succeed. So whatever we say, when personally
concerned, we act the desirability of a relatively early involvement
in the operating craft of the law. We are, in effect, developing a new
synthesis between on the one hand, university-based legal studies,
relating the law to its circumambient fields of knowledge and, one
hopes, to social needs, teaching the history, philosophy and

Law Schools and Other Reformatories 219

sociology of the law, and on the other, training by apprenticeship in
the processes of legal practice. It is a synthesis that has emerged
from the pressures of the market-place and from the students'
ambition to move more swiftly to efficient practice of the law in a
context of the traditional and leisurely flow of the academic
calendar.
For my own part, I see this as an excellent development. It has, of
course, some disadvantages. First, this experience of relating
university-based studies to legal practice is denied to some students
and in that denial to some, while this opportunity is provided to
others, I see us as involved in unfairness and thus in doing harm.
Further, even for those who are given this conjoint or sequential
opportunity it is a choppy experience when given in this way nine months in law school, three in a law office (thrice repeated
since the bar examinations contaminate the third summer). And this
choppy experience does harm, too. Hence, my proposal: It would
not be impracticable to re-organize the structure of legal education
the better to facilitate the congruent and conjoint training both in the
culture and the craft of the law.
Some would answer: that is precisely what the night law school
tries to do; it takes those who work in law firms during the day and
teaches them the basic concepts of the law in the evenings. But that
is a sad denigration of my theme. Devoting only the butt end of the
day to the great culture of the law, its philosophy, history and
values, is an impossible burden for any but the most exceptional
student to carry. We can do better than that.
Northeastern Law School in Boston is experimenting with a
different mix towards this same end which merits close observation.
The first year is much like the first year in other American law
schools, but during the second two years students are required to
work as full-time apprentices or legal assistants for at least four
three month periods in a wide variety of practices and geographic
areas, for example, with the public defender's office in Alaska, a
poverty law office in Hawaii, as well as in similar professional
opporunities that are found close to the Boston area. But this plan,
too, has a staccato quality to it, an artificial compartmentalization of
a legal education into the cultural and vocational, which seems to
me undesirable. And so let me present my own plan to this end.
This plan is nowhere in operation, so far as I know, but - and
otherwise I would not burden you with it - I believe it would
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greatly reduce the harm from the present gross deferment of getting
about the business of life we now impose on most of our law
students.
Before doing so, let me reflect just for a paragraph or two on how
it is that we have come to impose these undue delays, because
recognition of this history may facilitate breaking its binding chains.
The historical explanation in the United States is, I think, fairly
simple. When we wrenched legal education out of the law offices
and into the universities, we imposed the same timing on it as was
applied to all other university studies other than medicine. The
doctors have always been wise enough to take themselves
sufficiently seriously to avoid that error. Whereas it may be
appropriate, indeed essential, for the philosopher to escape his
philosophic studies for the long vacation to pursue more mundane
activities, that is certainly not true of the doctor and need not be true
of the lawyer. But, of course, there was another trade union group
who had vested interests in this leisurely patterning of legal
education, and that was the group to which I belong - the law
teachers. The long summer vacations are very pleasant indeed and,
unlike the law students, we do not have to involve ourselves in
efforts at summer placements in law offices to acquaint ourselves
with the processes of practice - Martha's Vineyard and the quiet
study for us.
We should break these chains binding us to the routine of the
university. For other disciplines it may well be appropriate; for us, it
is not. And so to my plan.
Let the first year stay as it is, with its heavy and wise reliance on
the case method, its excitement and competitive vigor. It seems to
me that the first year of law school, certainly in the law schools in
which I have taught, is an enormously exciting experience for most
law students, a period of the most rapid and effective cultural
adaptation. The change in the student during the first six weeks of
law school, in his maturity and patterns of thought and speech,
seems to me astonishing, and indeed the whole first year quickens
the mind and the spirit and should not be tampered with. It is
somewhat of a lock-step, and I am by no means sure that those
students who most succeed at it prove to be the wisest and best of
our lawyers, but it is an educational artifact, the product of chance
and tradition, which it will not be easy for us greatly to improve
upon. But thereafter, things change. A summer placement, if the
student is fortunate. Back to the Chinese menu of the second and
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third years, with moot court and the legal aid clinic properly
competing in many law schools with a wide range of optional
courses to be taken at any time and in almost random sequence over
the next two academic years. Again, if fortunate, a placement in
law-related work in the second summer, and the student is ready to
graduate from law school about 33 months after he arrived there, fit
for the hard preparatory work of the bar examinations and then, oh
at last then, an end of adolescence and the beginning of the maturity
of work.
Why not this? And I fit my suggestion to the classroom
requirements of current rules of the American Bar Association and
of the Association of American Law Schools so that it shall not be
thought that I wish by one iota to cut down on the theoretical and
culturally significant courses we offer in the law schools in favour
of a larger dose of the minutiae of legal practice.
Let us have only a brief, say, three-week vacation at the end of
the first year and then return to, in effect, the existing second year
program, with its largely unfettered choice of subjects to be studied.
Then, after in effect eighteen months of work in the law school, the
student would be ready for a quite different professional placement
in the law which, in my view, would build on the great traditions of
apprenticeship that created the Common Law in England of the late
nineteenth century and would also keep all that is best in our North
American university-based training in the law.
What I will call "the third year," but which is in effect a twelve
month period added on to the earlier eighteen months of
university-centered legal education, would require the student to be
placed in a law firm, a public prosecutor's office, a public
defender's office, the legal department of a bank, and so on, but
certainly under the supervision of an established practitioner. His
role would be that of the master to the apprentice, and indeed before
I was admitted as a barrister in Australia, I was required to serve for
a year in such articles of clerkship, from which I must say that by
good fortune I gained greatly. Generally speaking, my peer group
took the same view of articles of clerkship, though there were, of
course, some who had rather miserable experiences. But even the
miserable experiences can be minimized, and I think they should
be. The mechanism of their minimization is that the law school must
continue to take the closest interest in its "third year" students.
How should that interest be expressed?
First, the articles of clerkship must make allowance for the
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regular and necessary continuance of legal studies in the late
afternoon or early evenings of several days of each week of the
"third year." At this stage of close proximity to professional
practice, this burden is not nearly as severe as it is for those who
undertake legal studies part-time throughout their legal education.
Second, the law school must provide sufficient supervision of the
professional experience of its third year students so that close liaison
is maintained with the supervising lawyers. They must be brought
into regular contact with groups of third year students, not only with
their own apprentice or apprentices, to discuss the significance of
the work the students are doing in their professional placements,
generally to give them something of the supervised clinical
experience that the medical student gets in the teaching hospitals.
The adjunct law teachers should be remunerated modestly, but
the role will come to be seen both as a mark of distinction and as a
task of professional service to be undertaken by those who aspire to
senior positions in the profession. Again, the analogy with the
doctor's appointment in the teaching hospital is both close and
appropriate.
Handled this way, it should be possible to avoid the routine
slavery that characterized some articles of clerkship in the earlier
apprenticeship models of legal education and to enrich the students'
practical experience by regular group discussion of its larger
significance. I would see it as an essential element of this plan that
faculty supervision of reasonable intensity is provided for every
third year student in relation to that practicum - to be precise, say
one faculty supervisor for every twenty third year students, and for
calculation of teaching loads I would regard this supervision of
twenty third year students as equivalent to teaching one course.
Let me stress that I see none of this as an alternative to present
courses and seminars; rather, it is an addition, mobilizing the bar to
expediting and, in my view, improving legal education. The extra
costs are modest. The avoidance of our present leisurely waste of
the students' time is important. I am, of course, not alone in
recommending modification of the law school curriculum towards
two years of academic study and a third year devoted to clinical and
practical experience, though I believe the balance between the two I
have suggested is original. At all events, Francis Allen in his recent
excellent book, "Law, Intellect and Education", reflects on such
proposals (p. 89) and suggests that they "surely deserve the closest
attention". He adds (pp. 89-90):
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One hopes that the bench and bar in weighing this or other
thoroughgoing educational reforms will demand a careful
experimental scrutiny of the proposal before moving to
mandatory implementation. Educational nostrums, like chemical
medications, require careful preliminary testing before they can
be safely prescribed. Is it self-evident that placing a student in
apprentice status for one-third of his training represents the
optimum use of time for all persons entering the profession?
What allocation of costs and functions between the profession
and the schools is to be made? If, as seems likely, these programs
will result in increased costs of law training, what are the
implications for increased costs of legal services to the public and
the accessibility of legal education for those of limited means?
Assuming that the competence sought to be advanced by these
proposals can be adequately defined and identified, will the
educational program provide lasting or only temporary advantages for the students? Will a young lawyer three or five years in
practice demonstrate significantly greater command over professional skills than those of similar experience in practice but more
conventionally trained?
Allen is surely correct in this and, if I may, here lies one of the
advantages of my proposal - its ease of testing on a few students in
any law school willing to try it without being adopted as policy for
all - and the few on whom it would be tested could be volunteers.
All that is required is a summer term for those students at the
beginning of their second year of legal studies who wish to join this
program. For a law school like ours in Chicago, which does not
offer a summer term, it would be necessary to provide classroom
instruction during the summer in three or four subjects that are
normally taken by most students sometime during their second or
third years, so that, for them, there could be eighteen months of
largely uninterrupted university-based full-time legal studies. This
would not be a prohibitive addition to the budget and the only other
additional load for the Faculty would be the faculty supervisor for
these first twenty volunteers as they move into the twelve months of
their practicum.
How would one evaluate such a scheme? Gradualism and tests
are fine provided the criteria of success are defined. Certainly it
would not be practicable to defer evaluation until the twenty guinea
pigs were judges and leading practioners telling war stories of their
unusual pattern of legal education. I think customer satisfaction is
the answer. Let the students and practioners vote, in effect, with
their feet, expanding the opportunity for this arrangement of legal
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education if the better practioners will undertake the supervisory
role and if more students wish to pursue it. Otherwise restrict or
abolish the program and forget the fifth Horace Read Memorial
Lecture.
It may be thought that this plan for eighteen months of full-time
university-based legal studies, followed by twelve months of
part-time practice and part-time university-based legal studies is a
concession to the craft over the culture, the victory of the routine
over theory, of the practical over the jurisprudential. I reject that
indictment. Nothing seems to be more important in the topic I
address this afternoon than the "preservation and extension of an
intellectually-based and humanistically-motivated legal education";
but it is my view that for all but a handful of students this could be
more likely of achievement under the timetable I suggest than under
our present structure of quarters or terms with interstitially brief
bouts of practicum. Adherence to the university's leisurely
timetable is not a condition precedent to university-based legal
studies. Indeed, two and a third academic years of university-based
studies uninterrupted by the three months of diverse summer
activity may well provide a better setting for closer links with the
like of the university as a whole than now obtains since it is not true
that universities, unlike bears, aestivate. I find in the universities in
which I have taught that in the summers there is a great deal of
activity in other faculties departments to which I can relate.
The details of this plan go on and on. At one stage in my life I
thought them through reasonably fully, since I was prepared to
undertake the deanship of such a school if it could be created; but I
failed in persuading the local bar of the particular city where we had
hoped to launch the plan to lend support. And here lies the problem
that may break the back of my plan.
I am by way of being stupidly over-optimistic, and it is my view
that there is a great deal of goodwill in the practicing bar towards
legal education. I continue to believe that if properly mobilized, one
could gain the degree of support for this new type of apprenticeship
related to legal education to gain the best of both the English
nineteenth century and the North American twentieth century
worlds of legal education. The lawyers support could be moved by
benevolence and by self-interest, since out of the supervisory
relationship there comes a superb opportunity to decide whether the
student would be a suitable member of the firm, a find to be added
to the stable or rather someone who might be allowed to go
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elsewhere. It would be an excellent recruitment process properly
used and a booming, prosperous, proud bar has within it an ample
number of people generously inclined towards legal education.
Given some appropriate links to law school, they would
undertake this type of supervision - or so I believe. On the other
hand, it must be admitted that on the one occasion when I put a few
weeks into trying to launch this scheme, I gained an adequacy of
support promised by individuals but no agreement on the part of the
organized bar that they would foster this development. The case
was, however, a rather special one, and I do not think a failure in
one brief essay to launch it in one city should spell the total rejection
of the plan.
Briefly, what is to be said in its favour? I believe it would involve
no decline whatsoever in conditioning to the culture of the law; I
believe it would provide a substantial increment in the relationship
between the culture and the practice of the law. If the "third year"
partnership between the law school and the profession were
reasonably well handled, one could expect great advantages for the
student, for the law school and, if I may, also for the members of
the bar who chose to join in this not unimportant educative activity.
Students would have a sense of being involved in their profession
after eighteen months of legal studies instead of after our present
thirty-three months; that is no small advancement. And one final
unfair piece of special pleading. They will rarely admit it in public
but if you will press experienced law teachers at many of the leading
American law schools, you will find that they will tell you that a
minority of their second-and third-year students are already, in
effect, doing what I suggest but without supervision and without
rational planning. Quite a few of our second- and third-year
students, how many I do not know, but I believe this to be true of
most of the American law schools, are already involved in
substantial work, if they are fortunate, in law firms throughout the
academic year and also manage to fit their work in the law schools
around the exigencies of practice, to the disadvantage of both. Far
from seeing them as manipulators and schemers, vigorously to be
discouraged from part-time studies, I see them as path-finders
towards a more rational organization of legal education.
Teaching FactFinding
Let me inflict on you one last reflection, flowing from my
conjoint interest in legal education and in reform of the criminal
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justice system. This theme has or has not a value entirely
independent of the previous plan for the structure of legal education,
which I risked putting before you.
Almost as important as the contribution of the case method to
legal education has been the insight of the realist school of
jurisprudence that the prediction of what courts will do and why, of
how legal rules work out in practice, of how legal rules might be
reformed better to serve social interests, should be a central focus of
legal studies and professional concern. Few will doubt the value of
this realist approach. But here is my difficulty with it. We always
seem to assume that these facts of the operation of law and of legal
rules are easy to acquire; that, in effect, the Brandeis brief is easy to
draft. One might have to employ, on a temporary basis, a
statistician or two, an odd sociologist, possibly even an
anthropologist, a psychologist or psychiatrist; but the information
they had to supply could quite quickly be acquired, and on it one
could assess the social realities and the likely consequences of social
reform. Nothing could be further from the truth. We have not yet
begun to implement the ideas of the realists. It turns out that these
facts of society are enormously difficult to acquire. In the United
States we lack, for example, basic statistical data on the incidence
of crime, and we are certainly totally without reliable guidance on
the consequences of our social interventions. A country which has
remarkably efficient census processes, given the size and
complexity of the task, has ludicrously inefficient statistical and
demographic data on crime, criminals, and on police, court, and
correctional practices. Last week I spent on a consultantship to the
U.K. Home Office Research Unit finding to my surprise that they
too are plagued by the absence of offender based statistics capable
of following the flow of cases through the interlocking police,
prosecutorial, judicial and correctional discretions that make up the
justice system, and, as a result, are equally at a loss as to the
consequences of their interventions in this system. Generally
speaking legal education gives the student very little insight indeed
into the complexities of this type of fact-finding. As the lawyer
takes on new roles and new obligations in an increasingly complex
society, this lack becomes of serious concern. The Chief Justice of
the United States phrased it well:
The day when lawyers and judges could confine themselves
sedately to deeds, wills, trusts, and matters of commerce is gone.
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They must increasingly devote their special skills and talents to
the large problems of community and national concern.
One can hardly doubt the truth of this statement; and if the culture of
the law must embrace these larger concerns, then it is of first
importance that legal education include sone training in the
methods of social fact-finding and some understanding of the gveat
complexity of social reform. So often our benevolent interventions
do not achieve beneficence; so often there are unexpected
consequences of social intervention. This is as true of the legislative
as it is of the regulatory processes of the law. It is as true of case law
as it is of negotiation and settlement in the law office. And I find a
startling neglect of analysis of the difficulties of social fact-finding
and of the processes of law reform, widely defined, in legal
education. Nor is this gap too difficult to fill. Like other aspects of
the legal culture, it can be done around almost any area of legal
studies. The point is as valid of wills and estates as it is of contracts,
of legislation, and of criminal law. But somewhere, somewhere, in
every students' legal education there should be some consideration
in depth of the methods by which social facts may be found relevant
to legal concerns and against which the consequences of change in
the law may be measured. The skills of the social scientist have too
long been taken for granted as if they were readily on stream. The
trouble is that the stream passes by unless the lawyer has at least
sufficient knowledge to know how effectively to divert it to his use.
I talked earlier about the virtues of voluntarism. Let me now
retract somewhat from that value. It does seem to me that the recent
report of the American Bar Association on Lawyer Competency:
The Role of The Law Schools is right when it recommends that (p.
8), "Even if it entails the loss of some teacher autonomy, the
three-year program should build in a structural way: to present
students with problems of successively broader scope and
challenge, to enable students to teach themselves, and to utilize
skills and knowledge earlier acquired." They make a case for, in
effect, some "majors", some consecutive areas of focus over the
years of the law course. And, at the very least as a voluntary option
this seems to me to make very good sense. If so, one element of
every such "major", of every topical study in increasing depth,
should be the inclusion of the empirical question, "how do we
know?", "how could we find out", and, "what would be the social
consequences of this proposed change?"
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To conclude this egocentric series of reflections on legal
education, let me hark back to my first year of law teaching. As I
said, I started as a temporary acting probationary assistant lecturer
at the London School of Economics, with relatively secure tenure of
nine months. My immediately supervising teachers, or so it seemed
to me, were Glanville Williams and Sir David Hughes-Parry, of
whom I stood in joint and several awe. It was clear that they
provided too fast a pace for the sort of competition I could offer, and
it was necessary for me to go elsewhere. I had studied law, with a
break for the War, in Melbourne, Australia; the law school at that
university, for reasons of sentiment and a gap in available law
teachers that the war had created, was prepared to offer me a
teaching position.
There then came an invitation to move to a Canadian law school,
not this one. After some uncertainties, the pull of family and home
dominated; but I have often wondered what pattern my life would
have followed had I come to this country, as my father did before
me, emigrating first to this country before by chance moving on to
Australia. These past few days with you have increased my
uncertainty in the wisdom of my choice. I have found this a
superbly interesting law school, with a creative faculty and a
vigorous and thoughtful student body. It has been a great pleasure
for my wife and myself to be with you, and it has been a privilege to
offer these inadequate reflections as this year's Horace Read
Memorial Lecture.

